There are a couple of takeaways from the Nenggiri state by-election. The most important of these is that there are pockets of voters in the PAS-held states of the North who are not die-hard PAS supporters. Given alternatives or a lack of them, they may vote for PAS’ opponents.

The seat was held by Umno since 2004 but was won by Perikatan Nasional (PN) in the state elections last year by a very narrow margin of 810 votes in the green wave that swept across the northern states. The seat was declared vacant because PN’s Bersatu candidate who won it lost his party membership.

With PAS holding sway in the north, the chances of Umno winning back the seat were seemingly slim. But Umno won, and not by any small margin but by a thumping 3,352-vote majority! According to political scientist Bridget Welsh, the main reason for Umno’s win was due to a swing from the youth, women and economically disadvantaged voters. (A Nenggiri balm: Umno’s by-election flip, Malaysiakini.)

Umno must also be credited for its success because it conducted a well-organized campaign where Umno members did considerable leg work which paid off among the swing voters of youth, women and the poor.

This is the first takeaway from the Nenggiri by-election. It is proof that there are peripheral seats in PAS-influenced areas which, with a good fight, can be won by a non-PAS party candidate, including PAS’ partner in PN, Bersatu.

The main reason why Umno was able to maintain the support of the Malay majority for nearly six decades is the promise of funds that is available to them if Umno leads the government.

When Umno lost that majority support to PN in GE15, it was premised on the belief that PN, having formed a Malay-majority government after the Sheraton Move, would continue to form the next government with their support. That did not materialise and Umno now back in government could be seen as being in the position to help the poorer Malay voters who are more dependent on government help.

This is the second takeaway from the Nenggiri buy-election that PN should take note of. PN can not be complacent in the belief that Malay support, especially for PAS and hence, PN, is guaranteed. PN parties have to work hard to keep the peripheral seats that PAS now holds and win new Malay-majority seats.

PN must start work now to develop allies with whom it can face the next general election in the confidence that with Malay support it can and will form the next government. If that confidence is not communicated to the Malay voters, PN will lose more seats.

The third takeaway from the Nenggiri by-election is that Bersatu needs to field its own candidates in those seats where there are segments of Malay voters who have not bought into PAS’ Islamic agenda. Those seats number more than the conservative seats and Bersatu needs to field candidates who can appeal to this segment of voters nationwide.

PN is claiming that money politics played a key role among 2,000 of its supporters in the Nenggiri by-election who were bribed or intimidated, and who didn’t vote or voted for Umno. If this were true, it could have only happened if these voters lost confidence in Bersatu. Bersatu needs to start restoring the confidence of its members.

There were some reports which claimed that some Bersatu members, unhappy with the leadership, revolted by not campaigning or voting. That’s the most important reason for Bersatu to resolve its leadership issues according to what the members want.

If PN wants to form the next government, it must not make the mistakes it made in the Nenggiri by-elections and start acting proactively now to build up its membership and develop allies and a larger grassroots base.